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Shannon O'Byrne*

Assessing Exclusion Clauses: The
Supreme Court of Canada's Three Issue
Framework in Tercon Contractors Ltd v
British Columbia (Transportation and
Highways)

Introduction
The Supreme Court of Canada's 2010 decision in Tercon Contractors
Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation and Highways)' concerned the
enforceability of a broadly drafted exclusion clause in the context of public
procurement tendering. It is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the
decision unanimously articulated a three-issue framework for determining
the enforceability of exclusion clauses. Second, and on a more theoretical
front, Tercon offered competing visions as to how contracts are to be
interpreted. Though the Supreme Court was unanimous that parties to a
contract should-of course-generally be bound by its terms, the majority
and dissent followed significantly different paths for determining the scope
of the agreement at bar. Justices LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, and
Cromwell (in a majority decision delivered by Cromwell J.) approached
the task of contractual interpretation by elevating the long-standing and
judicially enforced values that specifically inform the tendering process2
including notions of integrity, transparency, and business efficacy.
The dissent, per McLachlin C.J., Binnie, Abella, and Rothstein JJ., in a
judgment delivered by Binnie J., emphasized another set of long-standing

Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. A version of this comment was presented at
the National Judicial Institute's Civil Law Seminar (Contracts, Conflicts and Remedies: A "Supreme"
Update) on 2 May 2012 in Moncton, NB. I would like to thank Justice Adele Kent (Alberta Court
of Queen's Bench) for first suggesting this topic. I would also like to thank Professors David Percy
and Tamara Buckwold (Faculty of Law, University of Alberta), Professor Richard Devlin (Faculty of
Law, Dalhousie University), and Edmonton lawyer James McGinnis (Parlee McLaws) as well as an
anonymous reviewer, for their very useful commentary on an earlier version of this paper. Errors and
omissions remain my own.
1. 2010 SCC 4 [Tercon].
As is well known, the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen (Ont) v Ron Engineering,[1981]
2.
I SCR Il l [Ron Engineering]ruled that when a tenderer submits a bid this may give rise to "Contract
A." Contract A refers to the contract which governs the relationship between tenderer and owner
during the tendering process. Only the successful tenderer enters into the main contract for the project
in question, which is called Contract B. Whether Contract A comes into existence depends on the
parties' intentions, as emphasized in MJB Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction, [1999] 1 SCR
619 at para 19 [MIB Enterprises]. For analysis, see Tercon, ibid, para 17 (per Cromwell J) and para
87 to 94 (per Binnie J). For very recent analysis, see, also, David Percy, "The Evolving Reality of
Tendering Contracts: Some Commonwealth Comparisons" (2012) 28 Construction Law Journal 105
[forthcoming], and David Percy, "Tercon in the Supreme Court of Canada: Much Ado About Nothing
or All's Well that Ends Well?" (2010) copy on file with the author.
*
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andjudicially enforced values, namely freedom ofcontract and fidelity to the
legal principle that contracts are to be enforced according to their words. And
third, the Supreme Court of Canada laid to rest the doctrine of fundamental
breach as it applies to exclusion clauses-or attempted to at least.3
In order to explore these themes, this comment provides a brief account
of the facts of Tercon and the Supreme Court of Canada's three issue
framework concerning the enforceability of exclusion of liability clauses.
It demonstrates that Tercon is, at bottom, simply a clearer statement of the
law first articulated by.Dickson C.J. and Wilson J. in HunterEngineering
Co v Syncrude Canada Ltd.4 This comment then offers some brief
conclusions, including that Canada's pre-Tercon caselaw retains much of
its precedential shine.
Tercon concerned the enforceability of a wide-reaching exclusion of
liability clause (called a "no-claims" clause in this case) emanating from a
request for proposals (RFP) for highway construction by the Province of
British Columbia (the Province). The exclusion clause in Contract A stated
as follows:
Except as expressly and specifically permitted.. .no Proponent shall
have any claim for compensation of any kind whatsoever, as a result of
participating in this RFP, and by submitting a Proposal each Proponent
shall be deemed to have agreed that it has no claim.s
The main question for the court was whether this clause sanitized breaches
of Contract A by the Province which included intentionally accepting a
bid from an ineligible bidder.6 The successful bid ostensibly came from
Brentwood (an eligible bidder) but, in truth, was made on behalf of a joint
venture between Brentwood and Emil Anderson Construction Co (EAC).
EAC's participation rendered the bid patently ineligible; the Province
plainly and clearly knew that.' Also of tremendous concern was that the
Province concealed its selection of an ineligible, joint venture bid by
making it appear that Brentwood was the sole bidder.' As noted by Justice
Cromwell, the trial judge (Justice Dillon) made it clear that the Province:

3.
See Angela Swan & Jakub Adamski, "Fundamental Breach Is Dead; Or Is It? Tercon Contractors
Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation and Highways)" (2010) 49 Can Bus U 452 (on the Supreme
Court's failure to end fundamental breach, despite its efforts) and my comments infra.
4.
[1989] 1 SCR 426 [HunterEngineering].
5.
Tercon, supra note I at para 60.
6. Ibid at para 59.
7.
Ibid at para 43. See also paras 10 and 23.
8.
Ibid at para 43.
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(1) fully understood that the Brentwood bid was in fact on behalf of a
joint venture of Brentwood and EAC; (2) thought that a bid from that
joint venture was not eligible; and (3) took active steps to obscure the
reality of the situation.9
Given these troubling circumstances, the trial judge refused to permit
the Province to shelter behind the exclusion clause on two grounds. First,
she concluded that the clause was ambiguously phrased, which contra
proferentem resolved in favour of plaintiff Tercon.' 0 Second, she applied
the Supreme Court of Canada's dual analysis in Hunter Engineering,"
as combined in Guarantee Co of North America v Gordon Capital
2
Dillon J. concluded that the Province had breached Contract A
Corp.1
in a fundamental way" and that whether the exclusion clause prevailed
depended on whether the result would be "unconscionable [per Dickson
C.J.] or unfair, unreasonable, or contrary to public policy [per Wilson
J.]."l4 Justice Dillon determined that the Province's conduct was highly
objectionable and that it was accordingly "neither fair nor reasonable to
enforce the exclusion clause."" As she concluded:
The Ministry acted egregiously when it knew or should have known that
the Brentwood bid was not compliant and then acted to incorporate EAC
indirectly in contract B whilst ensuring that this fact was not disclosed.
These circumstances do not lead this court to give aid to the defendant
by holding the plaintiff to this clause.'"
Justice Dillon awarded the plaintiff approximately $3.3 million,
representing its loss of profit on the highway project."
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada largely affirmed the trial
judge's decision though following a slightly different path. It determined
that the concept of fundamental breach in relation to exclusion clauses

Ibid at para40.
9.
10. Tercon v ProvinceofBritish Columbia,2006 BCSC 499 at para 148, per Dillon J [Tercon 20061.
11. Supra note 4.
12. As the court states in GuaranteeCo of North America v Gordon Capital Corp, [1999] 3 SCR
423 [Guarantee Co]: "The only limitation placed upon enforcing the contract as written in the event
of fundamental breach would be to refuse to enforce an exclusion of liability in circumstances where
to do so would be unconscionable, according to Dickson C.J., or unfair, unreasonable or otherwise
contrary to public policy, according to Wilson J." at para 52. Note that this summary is correct in
relation to Wilson J's test but not in relation to Dickson CJ's test-his test is not triggered by the
precondition of there being a fundamental breach, only hers is.
13. Tercon 2006, supra note 10 at para 148.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid atpara 150.
16. Ibidat para 150.
17. lbidat para 187.
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should be laid "to rest"'" and then concluded that the no-claims clause did
not cover the breach in question whether on its plain meaning or, assuming
9
ambiguity, via contraproferentem.1
Justice Binnie's dissenting decision also found that the Province
was in breach of Contract A20 but held that the Province could rely on
its exclusion clause as a full defense. The dissent thereby affirmed the
unanimous decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 2' in its
entirety. 22
Both the majority and dissent concurred, however, with respect to the
three issue approach or framework that courts are to follow in assessing
the enforceability of exclusion clauses. Binnie J.'s introduction of this
three issue framework is as follows:
The first issue, of course, is whether as a matter of interpretation, the
exclusion clause even applies to the circumstances in evidence. This
will depend on the Court's assessment of the intention of the parties as
expressed in the contract. If the exclusion clause does not apply, there is
obviously no need to proceed further with this analysis. If the exclusion
clause applies, the second issue is whether the exclusion clause was
unconscionable at the time the contract was made, "as might arise from
the situations of unequal bargaining power between the parties" (Hunter,
at p 462). This second issue has to do with contract formation, not breach.
If the exclusion clause is held to be valid and applicable, the Court may
undertake a third enquiry, namely whether the Court should nevertheless
refuse to enforce the valid exclusion clause because of the existence of
an overriding public policy, proof of which lies on the party seeking to
avoid enforcement of the clause, that outweighs the very strong public
interest in the enforcement of contracts. 23
It is important to emphasize that the Supreme Court was unanimous
only with respect to the barebones of the framework itself (quoted above)
and not in how that framework is to be understood or analysed or applied.
While Justice Cromwell for the majority stated that he agreed with the
"analytical approach that should be followed when tackling an issue
relating to the applicability of an exclusion clause set out by my colleague
Binnie J.," 24 including that the doctrine of fundamental breach should be

18. Tercon, supra note I at para 62.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibidatpara 126.
21. Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia, 2007 BCCA 592.
22. Tercon, supra note I at para 142.
23. Ibid at para 122-123.
24. Ibid at para 62.
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retired,25 his judgment did not offer an endorsement of the way in which
Binnie J. described the framework. In fact, as already briefly alluded to,
the majority and the dissent expressly disagreed on how the first issue
should be deployed in relation to the dispute at bar. And only Binnie J.
offered any commentary at all on issues 2 and 3. Accordingly, while the
three issue framework itself states the law in Canada, only Cromwell J.'s
analysis of issue 1 is the majority view. Commentary offered by Binnie
J .on issues 2 and 3-with the exception of the matter of fundamental
breach -saw no express majority endorsement and remains part of the
dissenting judgment.
What follows is Binnie J.'s framework, with commentary from the
majority and dissent as relevant.
1. As a matter of interpretation,does the exclusion clause apply to the
circumstances?
Justice Cromwell interpreted Contract A's exclusion clause by following
an expressly contextual approach. Indeed, the majority uses the word
"context" at least ten times 26 in assessing the clause's reach. As will be
seen, the dissent-by way of contrast-was persuaded by a siloed strategy
which focused much more exclusively on the strict words of the exclusion
clause itself.
Justice Cromwell concluded that the exclusion clause did not apply
to the circumstances at bar, stating: "Having regard to both the text of the
clause and its broader context and to the purposes and commercial context
of the RFP, my view is that this claim does not fall within the terms of the
exclusion clause." 27 In short, Tercon's damages claim did not arise from
Tercon's participation in the Province's process-which was all the clause
purported to cover-but from the Province's "unfair dealings with a party
who was not entitled to participate in that process."28
29
The Court justified its conclusion by referencing MIB Enterprises
and the longstanding principle that contractual interpretation does
not occur in isolation from the contract's "purposes and commercial
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid at para 64 ("commercial context" used twice); para 65 ("commercial context"); para 66
("commercial context" and "broader context"); para 67 ("special commercial context"); para 68
("context" used twice); para 72 ("statutory context"); and para 78 ("commercial context"). Cromwell
J uses the word context elsewhere in his judgment, but not in this sense. By way of contrast, Binnie
J uses the words "commercial context" only on two occasions: in para 118 and 119 in his analysis of
when an exclusion clause might not be enforced based on public policy. He also uses "commercial
context" in para 131 but as a means of explicating freedom of contract.
27. Ibid at para 66.
28. Ibid atpara 7.
29. Supra note 2, cited by Cromwell J in Tercon, supra note I at para 67.
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context."30 Cromwell J went on to note that tendering triggers a "special
commercial context,"' which includes the importance of making the
process "effective." 32 This, in turn, invoked the values of "integrity and
business efficacy."" Relying on lacobucci and Major JJ. in MartelBuilding
34
Cromwell J. quoted as follows: "[i]t is imperative that all
Ltd v Canada,
bidders be treated on an equal footing.... Parties should at the very least
be confident that their initial bids will not be skewed by some underlying
advantage in the drafting of the call for tenders conferred upon only one
potential bidder."
Justice Cromwell also emphasized the need for "transparency for the
public at large"3 6 in the context of public procurement.37 In direct support
of bringing this value to his contractual analysis, Cromwell J. referenced
the relevant statute, the Ministry of Transportation and Highways Act,"
(the Transportation Act) which mandated public tenders for highway
construction as modified by ministerial approval.39 Justice Cromwell
concluded that such legislation-which seeks to "assure transparency and
fairness in public tenders" 4 0-was germane to the interpretational task at
hand.
Beyond this, Cromwell J. sought to locate the exclusion clause in the
overall context offered by the contract itself. He observed that Contract
A expressly restricted the eligibility of who could bid to only six named
players. It would, therefore, seem "unlikely" that the parties would intend
the exclusion clause to "effectively gut a key aspect of the approved
process." 4 1 Cromwell J.'s objective was to interpret the exclusion clause
30. Ibid at para 64. For Angela Swan & Jakub Adamski's concerns about this approach, see supra
note 3.
31. Tercon, supranote I at para 67.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Martel Building Ltd v Canada,2000 SCC 60 [Martel].
35. Tercon, supranote I at para 67, quoting Martel, ibid at para 116.
36. Ibid at para 68.
37. Ibid.
38. RSBC 1996, c 311 [TransportationAct].
39. In Tercon, supra note lat para 27, Justice Cromwell emphasized s 23 (1) of the Act, which
provided: "The minister must invite tenders by public advertisement, or if that is impracticable, by
public notice, for the construction and repair of all government buildings highways and public works
except for the following: ...
(c) if the minister determines that an alternative contracting process will result in competitively
established costs for the performance of the work. ...
(4) In all cases where the minister believes it is not expedient to let the work to the lowest bidder, the
minster must report to and obtain the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council before passing
by the lowest tender, except if delay would be injurious to the public interest."
40. Ibid at para 68.
41. Ibidatpara72.
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in a manner compatible with other provisions of the RFP and its premise
of limiting eligibility to six proponents. 4 2 This is a principle of wholistic
interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has regularly advanced in
the past, including in MJB Enterprises,4 3 as noted by Cromwell J. Another
example is BG Checo International Ltd v British Columbia Hydro &
PowerAuthority."
For Cromwell J., it would make very little sense for eligible bidders
to participate in the RFP "if the Province could avoid liability for ignoring
an express term concerning eligibility to bid on which the entire RFP was
premised and which was mandated by the statutorily approved process."4 5
He concluded that the clause did not foreclose Tercon's action and on
this basis, stopped the majority analysis at issue 1 of the framework. The
majority awarded judgment to Tercon in the amount provided for by the
trial judge.4 6
Justice Binnie, in dissent, stated that "while Ron Engineeringand its
progeny have encouraged the establishment of a fair and transparent bidding
process, Contract A continues to be based not on some abstract externally
imposed rule of law but on the presumed (and occasionally implied) intent
of the parties."4 7 This juxtaposition exposes the real divide between the
majority and the dissent. It is this: did the parties to the contract intend
the exclusion clause to erase the default values and characteristics that
courts have said accompany Contract A (such as integrity, transparency,
and good faith) or did the parties intend that the exclusion clause should
be interpreted within the context provided by those default values and
characteristics?
As already noted, Cromwell J. chose the latter conclusion regarding
contractual intention. Binnie J. chose the former and did so by emphasizing
freedom of contract-a matter which his judgment expressly mentioned
on at least nine occasions.4 8 To similar effect, Binnie J. referred to
42. Ibid at para 76.
43. Supra note 2.
44. [1993] 1 SCR 12 [BG Checo].
45. Tercon, supranote I at para 69. In relation to this kind of analysis, Jassmine Girgis expresses the
concern that Tercon could spell the demise of Ron Engineering. In short, a properly worded exclusion
clause would permit the owner to contract out of the requirement to choose compliant bids and to
treat bidders equally and with fairness: "Tercon Contractors: The Effect of Exclusion Clauses on the
Tendering Process" (2010) 49:2 Can Bus U 187 at 211.
46. Tercon, supra note I at para 80.
47. Ibidatpara93.
48. Ibid at para 82 ("freedom of contract"); para 85 ("freedom of contract"); para 86 ("freedom of
the parties"); para 96 ("freedom of contract"); para 117 ("freedom of contract"); para 118 ("freedom
of contract"); para 119 ("freedom of contract"); and para, 120 ("freedom of contract"). Cromwell 's
judgment does not contain the phrase "freedom of contract."
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Tercon's status-repeatedly-as a large, 4 9 experienced, 0 sophisticated,"
knowledgeable5 2 contractor which in no way suffered from inequality of
bargaining." The clear driver was that Tercon could take care of itself and
should be bound by the exclusion clause.
While the majority looked to the TransportationActS4 as providing
an important context to interpreting Contract A-including the values of
integrity and transparency"-Binnie J's main enquiry went to whether the
legislation forbade the exculpatory clause in question or not. He stated:
"While it is true that the Act favours 'the integrity of the tendering process',
it nowhere prohibits the parties from negotiating an 'exclusion' clause as
part of their commercial agreement."56 Since the Act did not place any
statutory fetters on freedom of contract, an exclusion clause was therefore
permissible."
Finding that the clause was permissible, Binnie J. also concluded that
the values of the statute had been implicitly ousted such that, on its face,
the clause covered the Province's breach. The Province thereby had a full
defense to Tercon's action" (subject to analysis of issue 2 and issue 3). By
submitting a tender, Tercon was "participating" in the RFP and its action
was, therefore, excluded. Views to the contrary, he noted with respect,
offered a "strained and artificial interpretation.""
The dissent concluded that that the clause applied even though the
Province-in Binnie J.'s surprisingly mild words given the government's
egregious conduct--"was at fault in its performance of the RFP." 60 This is
consistent with the notion that freedom of contract included the freedom
to make a bad bargain. As Binnie J. observed, the plaintiff Tercon "chose
to bid on the project on the terms proposed by the Ministry." 61 This echoed
the Province's submission that Tercon was a sophisticated commercial
party and should be bound by the terms to which it agreed, including the
exclusion clause. 6 2 But such an argument is highly problematic since, as

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Ibid at paras 82 and 95.
Ibid at paras 85, 95 and 102.
Ibid at paras 82, 85, 102 and 141.
Ibid at para 141, referring to contractors like Tercon.
Ibid at para 141.
Supra note 38.
See supra footnotes 37-41 of this comment and surrounding text.
Tercon, supra note I at para 101.
Ibidatparas 101-102.
Ibid at para 128.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 95.
Ibid at para 73.
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Cromwell J. noted, it "assumes the answer to the real question before us
which is: what does the exclusion clause mean?"" And that is very much
the crux of the issue.
It is also highly problematic for the dissent to conclude so easily that
the values associated with the TransportationAct could be ousted by the
Province. The legislation required that a provincial call for tenders be
made "reasonably available to the public," but that the minister could also
approve an alternate approach if the "minister believes that an alternative
contracting process will result in a competitively established cost for the
project."" Such an alternate process was followed in Tercon and beyond
this, ministerial approval was apparently given to the no-claims clause at
issue. 65 Even with that being the case, it is unconvincing for the dissent to
limit its analysis to this stark question: does the legislation itself expressly
forbid exclusion clauses? The overall legislative context-which Binnie J.
acknowledges "favours the 'integrity of the tendering process '66-must
also drive the analysis. A reading of the legislation that aligns with the
values associated with public procurement would permit exclusion clauses
to shelter the Province should it, for example, make an honest error in
awarding a tender to an ineligible bidder. Such an allocation is consistent
with the values of integrity and fairness mandated by legislation and the
common law of tendering alike: the bidder is being asked to assume the
risk of government making a mistake but not of government intentionally
defying the rules and seeking to obfuscate such conduct. Accordingly,
within the context of values offered by the Act, a clause that purports to
sanitize egregious governmental conduct is impermissible. 67 The clause
should either be understood as unenforceable for being contrary to the
legislation, or, following the solution offered by the majority, "read down"
so as to bring the clause in line with overarching legislative values.
As previously stated, the majority stopped its analysis after issue one
based on its finding that the clause did not cover the Province's breach. The
dissent, however, continued on with its assessment given its determination
that the clause did in fact provide a full defense to Tercon's claim.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid at para 97.
65. Ibid at para 99.
66. Ibid at para 101.
67. For discussion on point, see Christopher Armstrong, "The Life and Meaning of Tercon-A
Basil Fawlty Guide" in Construction Law Update, 2010 (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education
Society of British Columbia, 2010) at 1.1.7, online: CLEBC <http://online.cle.bc.ca/CourseMaterial/
pdfs/2010/358_I_1.pdf>. Armstrong also contends, at 1.1.8, that tendering contracts be recognized
as containing a term going to good faith and fair dealing, which term cannot be contracted out of by
operation of law.
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2.

Was the exclusion clause unconscionableat the time the contractwas
made, "as might arisefrom situations of unequal bargainingpower
between parties"?
With the endorsement of the majority, 68 Binnie J. officially retired
the doctrine of fundamental breach (as it relates to exclusion clauses)
in assessing the second issue. 6 9 He chose-again with the majority's
blessings-to adopt Dickson C.J.'s view in Hunter Engineering0 that
exclusion clauses are to be set aside when they are unconscionable as
measured at the time of contract formation." The competing test offered
by Wilson J. in Hunter was considered but implicitly rejected by Binnie
J.72

Given uncertainty surrounding fundamental breach. and what Dickson
C.J. precisely meant by the term "unconscionable," it is essential to briefly
review Hunter. The goal is to locate the proper scope or interpretation of
issue 2 in relation to this pivotal word "unconscionable" and how it differs
from the public policy analysis that ultimately drives issue 3.
As is well known, the doctrine of fundamental breach was created
by Lord Denning and holds that when a party breaches its contract in a
fundamental way then, by operation of law, that party cannot rely on an
exclusion clause in its favour.7 1 While there is no universally accepted
definition of fundamental breach, it includes the notion that one party,
through breach, has deprived the other party of substantially the whole
benefit intended under their contract.74 The Supreme Court of Canada
in Beaufort Realties et al v Chomedey Aluminum," in accord with the
House of Lords, 6 rejected Lord Denning's operation of law approach to
fundamental breach because that approach was divorced from an enquiry
regarding the parties' actual intentions.
In Hunter, the Supreme Court of Canada concurred that the reach of
an exclusion clause depended on the parties' intentions, but was evenly
split on the test as to when, on an exceptional basis, the court should not
give effect to the exclusion clause in question. Dickson C.J. (with La
Forest J. concurring) concluded that the notion of fundamental breach
68. Tercon, supranote I at para 62
69. Ibid at para 82
70. Supra note 2.
71. Tercon, supranote I at para 108.
72. Ibid at 122 where Dickson CJ's test is chosen in the wording of issue 2 of the framework.
73. Karsales (Harrow)Ltd v Wallis, [1956] 1 WLR 936 (CA), referenced by Binnie J in Tercon,
supra note I at para 106.
74. See Lord Diplock in Photo ProductionLtd v Securicor Transport Ltd, [1980] AC 827 (HL) at
849 [Photo Production]and other cases cited by Wilson J in Hunter,supra note 4 at para 137.
75. [1980] 2 SCR 718.
76. Photo Production,supra note 74 at 842-843.
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was unhelpful and should simply be replaced with an enquiry going to
whether the clause in question was unconscionable, as when there is
inequality of bargaining between the parties." Though Dickson C.J. most
regrettably did not define precisely what he meant by unconscionability,
Wilson J. implicitly saw him as invoking the classic contract law doctrine
whereby courts could set a contract aside based on the test of procedural
inequality and substantive unfairness.7 8 By way of contrast, Wilson J. (with
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurring), would preserve a role for fundamental
breach as a circumscribed trigger. When one party fundamentally breached
the contract, a court could decline to apply an exclusion clause where
enforcement would be "unfair or unreasonable."79
Whereas Dickson C.J. advocated assessing the contract only at
the time of formation, Wilson J. said her enquiry would take place
with reference to what actually happened, provided that a fundamental
breach had occurred." Wilson J. expressed concern that the doctrine of
unconscionability referenced by Dickson C.J. did not cover all relevant
circumstances and that the court had the power to take more into account.8 '
In Wilson J.'s words, there was "virtue in a residual power residing in
the court to withhold its assistance on policy grounds in appropriate
circumstances,"8 2 including the context provided by the fundamental
breach in question. To emphasize, Wilson J. did not reject the doctrine of
unconscionability per se. This is an indispensable contract law doctrine
that measures the voluntariness of an agreement at time of formation.
Wilson J.'s view, however, was that courts have a bounded discretion to
consider more than voluntariness.
Chief Justice Dickson criticized Wilson J.'s approach in the following
terms:
77. Hunter Engineering,supra note 4 at para 59 and as noted at para 108 of Tercon, supra note 1.
78. Ibid at para 159. There are various iterations of the doctrine of unconscionability, but, as stated
by McLachlin JA (as she then was) in PrincipalInvestments Ltd v Thiele Estate (1987) 12 BCLR (2d)
258 at 263 (CA), the doctrine requires proof of two elements: "The first is proof of inequality in the
position of the parties arising out of some factor such as ignorance, need or distress of the weaker,
which leaves him or her in the power of the stronger [procedural inequality]. The second element is
proof of substantial unfairness in the bargain obtained by the stronger person [substantive unfairness.]
The proof of these circumstances creates a presumption of fraud which the stronger must repel by
proving the bargain was fair, just and reasonable..."
79. Hunter Engineering, supra note 4 at para 161. Note that the Supreme Court of Canada in
Guarantee Co, supra note 12, summarized Wilson 's test slightly differently, adding reference to
public policy. According to GuaranteeCo, at para 52, the "only limitation placed upon enforcing the
contract as written in the event of a fundamental breach would be to refuse to enforce an exclusion of
liability in circumstances where to do so would be unconscionable, according to Dickson CJ, or unfair
unreasonable,or otherwise contraryto public policy, according to Wilson J." [emphasis added]
80. Hunter Engineering,supra note 4 at para 159.
81. Ibid at para 159-160.
82. Ibid at para 160.
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I do not favour, as suggested by Wilson J, requiring the court to assess
the reasonableness of enforcing the contract terms after the court has
already determined the meaning of the contract based on ordinary
principles of contract interpretation. In my view, the courts should not
disturb the bargain the parties have struck....83
There are two responses to this. First, Wilson J.'s assessment of the
clause's reasonableness is only triggered in face of fundamental breach.
Otherwise, Wilson J. emphatically rejected a general reasonableness
measure 84 noting, for example, that a contractual provision that may seem
unfair to a third party "may have been the product of hard bargaining
between the parties and, in my view, deserves to be enforced by the courts in
accordance with its terms."" Second, it is more than puzzling for Dickson
C.J. to suggest that considering events at time of breach is necessarily
improper. There are many judicial pronouncements confirming the court's
residual power to deal with an unscrupulous party. As Binnie J. noted in
Tercon-from a more general perspective-the law recognizes that one
party's contractual performance can be "so aberrant" 86 and "extreme"" as
to "forfeit the protection of a contractual exclusion clause."" The court's
public policy goal in such an exercise is, as Binnie J. observed, to "curb
contractual abuse."89
As the summary above also shows, there are considerable and
significant differences9 o between the tests offered by Wilson J and Dickson
C.J. in Hunter.According to Richard Devlin, for example:
Dickson C.J.C. assimilated fundamental breach into the doctrine of
unconscionability, whereas Wilson J. retained fundamental breach/ex
post reasonableness as a supplementary regulatory mechanism by which
the. courts could police contracts they found objectionable. Despite
the clarity of their disagreement.. .not everyone agrees that there is a
substantive difference in their opinions.9'
That the two judgments in Hunter actually offer opposing views has
not always been sufficiently acknowledged either by the judiciary or by
academics. This merging or blending of crucial distinctions has been led in
part by Steven Waddams who offered the view that the difference between
83. Ibid atpara 51.
84. Ibid atpara 150.
85. Ibidatpara 151.
86. Ibid atpara 135.
87. Ibid atpara 137.
88. Ibid atpara 135.
89. Ibid at para 137.
90. For helpful discussion on the differences between the judgments of Dickson CJ and Wilson J
as well as overall analysis of the problem, see Richard Devlin, "Return of the Undead: Fundamental
Breach Disinterred" (2007) 86 Can Bar Rev I at 10-13.
91. Ibid at 13.
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unconscionable (per Dickson C.J.) and unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise
contrary to public policy (per Wilson J.) "in practice is unlikely to be
3
large." 92 This analysis has seen judicial approval on multiple occasions.
Though John McCamus has deftly suggested a way of uniting the two
judgments by taking an expansive reading of the word "unconscionability"
in Dickson C.J.'s decision, 94 even this exercise cannot erase Dickson C.J.'s
unequivocal rejection of Wilson J.'s view that a court could rightly take
into account circumstances at the time of breach. For Dickson C.J., that
"would disturb the bargain the parties have struck.""
It can also be seen that while Binnie J. purported to "shut the coffin on
jargon associated with 'fundamental breach"' 96 he may not have succeeded.
Binnie J. opined that categorizing a contractual breach as "'fundamental'
or 'immense' or 'colossal' is not particularly helpful"97 ; yet in his very
own judgment, he inevitably and unavoidably found himself having to
distinguish between types or levels of contractual breach all the same.
For example, in reference to issue 3, Binnie J. agreed that contractual
performance could be "so aberrant"98 that the exclusion clause's protection
is forfeit99 ; he acknowledged situations where one party's conduct in breach
of contract had been "so extreme"o00 as to "engage some overriding and
0 It is virtually
paramount public interest in curbing contractual abuse."o'
impossible not to read these references as surrogates for the phrase
"fundamental breach." 0 2 Likewise, Cromwell J.'s judgment is forced to

92. Waddams, The Law of Contract, 3d ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1993) at 323. See analysis
by Devlin, supra note 90 at his footnote 52.
93. For example, Waddams' view is quoted with approval in FraserJewellers (1982) Ltd vDominion
Electric Protection Co (1997), 148 DLR (4th) 496 (Ont CA) at para 28; Solway v Davis Moving &
Storage Inc (2002), 222 DLR (4th) 251 (Ont CA) at para 17; Plas-Tex CanadaLtd v Dow Chemical
of Canada Ltd (2004), 245 DLR (4th) 650 at para 51 [Plas-Tex]; and Van Hooydonk v Jonker, 2009
ABQB 8 at para 47. Cases that recognize a difference between the Wilson J and Dickson CJ approaches
include MacKay v Scott Packing and Warehousing Co (Canada)Ltd (1995), 192 NR 118 (FCA) and
Knowles v Whistler Mountain Ski Corp, [1991] BCJ No 61 (SC); See Devlin's analysis of these and
related cases, supra note 90 at 16 and following.
94. John McCamus, The Law of Contract (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 772 and following.
95. Hunter,supra note 4 at para 51.
96. Tercon, supra note 1 at para 82.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid atpara 135.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid at para 137.
101. Ibid at para 135.
102. Swan &Adamski observe, supranote 3, that if Tercon simply means that the phrase "fundamental
breach" will no longer appear in judgments then "it won't have done much," at 453.
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offer synonyms for the moniker, including references to the "foundation of
the whole RFP"o 3 and "very root of the RFP."'"

Setting all this to the side, however, it is very clear that, as at issue
2, Chief Justice Dickson carried the day. The unequivocal question at
issue 2 is whether the exclusion clause in question is unconscionable at
time of contract formation. Case law subsequent to Tercon-including
cases decisions from Alberta, 0 British Columbia,106 and Ontario' 7-has
uniformly understood the word "unconscionable" in issue 2 of Tercon
as requiring proof of procedural inequality and substantive unfairness0 s
(though the precise articulation of the test itself varies across jurisdictions.)
As summarized by the British Columbia Court of Appeal: "It is apparent
from the comments of Binnie J. [under issue 2]... that he was not intending
to signal a departure from the usual test for unconscionablity."'"'
3. Assuming validity of the clause at the time the contract was made,
is there any overridingpublic policy that wouldjustify the court's
refusal to enforce it?
According to Justice Binnie, exclusion clauses are enforceable unless
the innocent party "can point to some paramount consideration of public
policy sufficient to override the public interest in freedom of contract and
defeat what would otherwise be the contractual rights of the parties."" 0
This notion of public policy triggers the court's residual power-which
is rarely exercised-not to enforce the clause in question. For back up,
Binnie J. relied on Steven Waddams' assessment that "it is surely inevitable
that a court must reserve the ultimate power to decide when the values
favouring enforceability are outweighed by values that society holds to be
more important.""' Binnie J. also relied on an important pronouncement
by Duff C.J. in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Re Miller Estate:
103. Tercon, supra note I at para 76.
104. Ibid. See also, Armstrong, supra note 67 at 1.1.9, suggesting that, Tercon notwithstanding,
fundamental breach "is alive and well."
105. Horizon Resource ManagementLtd v Blaze Energy Ltd, 2011 ABQB 658 at para 1015 [Horizon
Resource], citing the Alberta Court of Appeal in Cain v ClaricaLife Insurance Co, 2005 ABCA 437.
106. Loychuk v Cougar Mountain Adventures Ltd, 2012 BCCA 122 at 29 and following; Roy v
1216393 Ontario Inc 2011 BCCA 500 at para 30 [Roy]; Hans v Volvo Trucks North America Inc, 2011
BCSC 1574 at para 81 and following.
107. Gyimah v Toronto Hydro-Electric System Ltd, 2012 ONSC 683 at para 46, citing Titus v
William F Cooke Enterprise Ltd 2007 ONCA 573; see also Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc v Rogers
CommunicationsInc, 2011 ONSC 5623 at para 176.
108. See supra note 78 for an unconscionablity test offered by McLachlin JA (as she then was).
For discussion of unconscionability in relation to Tercon, see Stephen Waddams, "Abusive or
Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective" (2010) 49 Can Bus LJ 378 at 391-92.
109. Roy, supra note 106 at para 30.
110. Tercon, supra note I at para 82.
111. Ibidatpara 115.

Assessing Exclusion Clauses

229

It is the duty of the courts to give effect to contracts and testamentary
dispositions according to the settled rules and principles of law, since we
are under a reign of law; but there are cases in which rules of law cannot
have their normal operation because the law itself recognizes some
paramount consideration of public policy which overrides the interest
and what otherwise would be the rights and power of the individual. 112
As an example of public policy analysis derived from the case law,
Binnie J. referenced Plas-Tex, a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.1 13
In Plas-Tex, the defendant Dow intentionally supplied defective resin
to the plaintiff who would use the resin in manufacturing natural gas
pipelines. Dow failed to disclose this defect to the plaintiff Some years
later, the pipelines began to fail causing property damage-including by
an explosion-and risk to human health and safety. The Alberta Court of
Appeal found Dow's attempts to exclude its liability on these facts was
"unconscionable."" 4 As summarized by Binnie J. in Tercon, the defendant
Dow had been "so contemptuous of its contractual obligation and reckless
as to the consequences of breach as to forfeit the assistance of the court."" 5
In this way, Binnie J. read Plas-Tex as going to an ex post public policy
analysis of all the circumstances.
Other examples of conduct violating public policy offered by Binnie
J. are even more extreme, namely:
* A vendor intentionally selling toxic cooking oil to unsuspecting
consumers; and
* A vendor intentionally selling toxic milk for consumption by
babies." 6
It is clear that no judge would permit an exclusion clause-however
masterfully drafted and intended at time of formation to exclude all claimsto permit the wrongdoer to escape liability in any of these examples. Fraud
(and criminality) unravels all. It is important to note, however, that while
Binnie J.'s examples are extreme, something less would most certainly
do. As he states: "[c]onduct approaching serious criminality or egregious
fraud are but examples of well-accepted and 'substantially incontestable'
considerations of public policy that may override the countervailing public
policy that favours freedom of contract,""' but that "the contract breaker's

112. Ibid at para 116, Binnie J quoting Re Millar Estate, [1938] SCR I at 4.
113. Supra note 93.
114. Ibidat para 129. For discussion, see Devlin, supra note 90 at 15 and at 35-36 who concluded that
court in Plas-Tex ultimately followed a Wilsonian approach.
115. Tercon, supranote I at para 119.
116. Ibid at para 118.
117. Ibid at para 120 [emphasis added].
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conduct need not rise to the level of criminality or fraud to justify a finding
of abuse.""'
Analysis of public policy at issue 3 most certainly can take into
account the context and nature of breach, putting one in mind of Wilson
J.'s judgment in Hunter. For example, Binnie J. stated that where
misconduct-such as serious criminality or egregious fraud-"is reflected
in the breach of contract, all of the circumstances should be examined very
carefully by the court. Such misconduct may disable the defendant from
hiding behind the exclusion clause.""' And beyond this, Binnie J. stated:
"I accept that there may be well-accepted public policy considerations
that relate directly to the nature of the breach, and thus trigger the court's
narrow jurisdiction to give relief against an exclusion clause." 2 0
It is particularly instructive to see Binnie J. quoting with approval
the following pronouncement from Plas-Tex, namely that: "a party to
a contract will not be permitted to engage in unconscionable conduct
secure in the knowledge that no liability can be imposed upon it because
of an exclusionary clause." 2' This Plas-Tex quotation, in turn, echoes a
rhetorical question posed by Wilson J. in Hunter:
should a party be able to commit a fundamental breach secure in the
knowledge that no liability can attend to it? Or should there be room for
the courts to say: this party is now trying to have his cake and eat it too.
He is seeking to escape almost entirely the burdens of the transaction but
enlist the support of the courts to enforce its benefits.122
Justice Binnie's approach resonates with Wilson J.'s view in Hunter
that the extreme nature of the breach-by whatever name-may preclude
the defendant from relying on the contract based on public policy. It is
hard to see a large difference between issue 3 in Binnie J.'s framework and
Wilson J.'s approach to the problem of exclusion clauses in Hunter. It is
true that Binnie J. was unhappy with the Wilson J. test because it stated that
a court may refuse to enforce an exclusion clause, in face of fundamental
breach, when it is "unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise contrary to public
policy."'"2 As he indicated in Tercon, "[w]hat has given rise to some
concern [regarding Wilson J.'s test] is not the reference to 'public policy',
118. Ibid at para 118 [emphasis added].
119. Ibid at para 120 [emphasis added].
120. Ibid at para 117 [emphasis added].
121. Plas-Tex, supra note 93 at para 53, quoted with approval by Binnie J in Tercon, supra note I at
para 119.
122. Hunter, supra note 4 at para 152.
123. This is the summary of the Wilsonian test offered by the SCC in Guarantee Co, supra note 12 at
para 52. For the entire test, see supra note 12.
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whose role in the enforcement of contracts has never been doubted, but to
the more general ideas of 'unfair' and 'unreasonable', which seemingly
confer on courts a very broad after-the-fact discretion."l24 But the response
to that criticism is this: the Wilson J. test of reasonableness and fairness is
triggered only in face of fundamental breach, that is, in the context of what
must be extreme and egregious conduct. In this way, judicial discretion is
confined to a very narrow range. And, at bottom, whether a judge used
Wilson J.'s language or Binnie J.'s language as a springboard for analysis,
there would appear to be very little difference in what would actually be
said.
As an example, consider the facts in Plas-Tex. Deploying Wilson J.'s
test and exact language (as indicated by italics), a judge might pronounce
as follows: "Dow committed a fundamental breach by failing to disclose
that it was supplying defective resin to the plaintiff, particularly as it knew
that the resin would be used in the construction of a natural gas pipeline.
The defective resin caused the pipes to fail, contributed to an explosion, and
put human health at risk. It would be unfair,unreasonable,and contrary to
public policy to permit Dow to rely on its exclusion clause." Is this really
very much different from a judge, this time relying on Binnie J.'s test
and exact language (as indicated by italics) saying: "Dow's contractual
performance-in supplying defective resin [and other deficiencies cited
just above]-was so aberrantand so extreme as to forfeit theprotection of
the contractualexclusion clause based on publicpolicy."
Though Binnie J. intentionally only used the words "public policy" in
his wording of issue 3 and eschewed reference to "vague notions of 'equity
or reasonableness' ,"125 the divide between his test and Wilson J.'s is small
indeed. He appears to have functionally adopted Wilson J.'s approach
as the test in issue 3, albeit minus any express reference to fundamental
breach. Indeed, the notion of fundamental breach is implicitly present in
Binnie J.'s reference to breaches that are "so aberrant" or "so extreme"
as "to forfeit judicial assistance. 126 Beyond this, issue 3 addresses public
policy measured at time of breach, which is all that Wilson J. ever did.
On the facts of Tercon, Binnie J. found no overarching public policy
objection to enforcing the Province's clause as written:

124. Tercon, supra note I at para 113.
125. Ibid at para 114.
126. Ibid at paras 135-137.

232 The Dalhousie Law Journal
I do not believe the Ministry's performance can be characterized as so
aberrant as to forfeit the protection of the contractual exclusion clause
on the basis of some overriding public policy. While there is a public
interest in a fair and transparent tendering process, it cannot be ratcheted
up to defeat the enforcement of Contract A in this case.'27
Since the Tercon decision, there is at least one case which has
considered Binnie J.'s approach to public policy in issue 3. In Horizon
Resource, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's exclusion clauses
did not apply because their operation "was premised" on the plaintiff's
complying with relevant Alberta Energy and Utility Board regulations.' 28
As summarized by Justice Brooker, the contention was "that the exclusion
clauses should not be enforced as the goals of overriding public policy with
respect to workers' safety, public safety, and the environment outweigh the
enforcement of the exclusionary clauses."l 2 9 In response, the court stated:
This case is not like Plas-Tex, in which Dow was found to have knowingly
and deliberately withheld information at significant peril to life and
property. I do not agree that technical non-compliance with regulation
of the sort in this case is one of those "substantially incontestable"
considerations of public policy that justifies interference with freedom
of contract.13 0
While the trial judge is correct that substantially incontestable
considerations-such as egregious fraud and serious criminality-will
cause the exclusion clause to fall-it is worth emphasizing that something
less might do. As Binnie J. noted in his analysis of public policy: "the
contract breaker's conduct need not rise to the level of criminality or fraud
to justify a finding of abuse." 3 '
At the end of a long journey, this comment concludes that Tercon's
three issue framework offers a reconstituted and streamlined Hunter
Engineering. Dickson C.J.'s unconscionablity test drives issue 2 and,
though not expressly acknowledged, Wilson J.'s test is at the heart of issue
3.
Conclusion
This comment offers two mains conclusions. The first is this: the Supreme
Court is philosophically divided (5:4) on how to approach the question
of contractual interpretation in issue 1. While the majority took a broad,
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Ibid at para 135.
Horizon Resource, supra note 105 at 1022.
Ibid.
Ibid at 1023.
Tercon, supra note I at para 118.

Assessing Exclusion Clauses

233

contextual approach to determining the reach of an exclusion clause, the
dissent's method is largely isolated from the values governing the tendering
process (under statute and at common law) as well as the context offered
by the contract as a whole. Though both the majority and the dissent sought
to enforce freedom of contract and locate the parties' true intention, they
followed very different means of doing so. That said, the majority's broad,
contextual approach to issue 1 is very much the law.13 2
Beyond this, the majority took the proper approach to interpretation.
When the Province initiated its RFP, it inevitably and intentionally
triggered a set of values (including transparency and fairness) that have
infused the tendering process through decades of common law. These
values are heightened in the public procurement context because the
public interest is more reliably served-at all times but especially in the
long term-when government receives competitive bids, as assessed by
a fair process. This perspective is also reflected in the Transportation
Act, which legislation, as already noted, Binnie J. himself acknowledged
33
as favouring "transparency and integrity of the bidding process."' It is
very troubling to think that these values are up for grabs simply because
the legislation does not expressly forbid an exclusion of liability clause
in Contract A. Exclusion clauses can indeed serve the public interest, but
only as assessed in the statutory context of fairness, openness, good faith,
and accountability. It is true, as Binnie J. remarked, that declaring the noclaims clause as contrary to the Act would result in British Columbia's
taxpayers having to pay "the contractor's profit twice over-once to
Brentwood/EAC for actually building the road, and now to Tercon, even
though in Tercon's case the 'profit' would be gained without Tercon
4
running the risks associated with the performance of Contract B." 3 The
apparent sting in these words, however, is misplaced. First, the exclusion
clause in Tercon stands or falls based on legal principles, not on what
happens to the taxpayers as a result of those legal principles being applied.
If the taxpayers have to pay twice over because the Province intentionally
mishandled a tender call, then that is the fault of the Province and the
taxpayers have a political solution to that problem: the ballot box. In fact,
there is a very large cost the other way. Setting aside the justice question
in relation to betrayed bidders like Tercon, public trust and confidence
132. And it is not just the Supreme Court of Canada that is divided over how to interpret the exclusion
clause in question. As David Percy notes in "Tercon in the Supreme Court of Canada",supra note 2 at
23: "[t]he closeness of the debate over interpretation is underscored by the fact that of the 13 judges
who were involved in Tercon until its final disposition, seven unequivocally found that the clause
protected the owner and six strenuously argued that it failed to do so."
133. Tercon, supranote I at para 132.
134. Ibid at para 134.
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in government is jeopardized when governments play by an unfair set
of procurement rules. Third, though Tercon is, as Binnie J. pointed out,
awarded its profit-should the clause fail-without the risks of having to
perform Contract B that is, again, because of the conduct of the Province.
Tercon was perfectly willing to assume the risks of Contract B-after all,
it bid on the project-but the Province egregiously shut Tercon out of the
competition and selected a patently ineligible bidder. It is puzzling for
Binnie J. to even implicitly lay any of this at Tercon's feet.
The second conclusion is: the framework for accessing the
enforceability of exclusion clauses offered by a unanimous Court in Tercon
is, at bottom, a more calibrated version of Hunter Engineering.Courts are
no longer asked to simply choose between the tests of Dickson C.J. and
Wilson J. or apply legal propositions trying to combine their two very
different approaches, as in Guarantee Co.' 5 Instead, as I have argued,
the Supreme Court functionally broke out the competing Hunter tests and
treated them as distinct issues in a three issue framework. The court in
Tercon relied on Dickson C.J.'s approach in HunterEngineering to power
issue 2 and-functionally-slotted Wilson J.'s approach into issue 3.
Though the court purported not to follow Wilson J.'s judgment in Hunter
and not to retain her notion of fundamental breach, it has largely done both
notwithstanding.
Binnie J.'s failure to recognize Wilson J.'s contribution to issue 3 of
the framework is regrettable on two fronts. First, it misses an opportunity
to acknowledge Wilson J.'s ongoing contribution to modern Canadian
jurisprudence. Second, it obscures the Hunter Engineering pedigree of
issue 3 and the implicit relevance of subsequent case law which interprets
Wilson J. 's public policy approach.
From a more general perspective, Justice Brooker from the Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench has already responded to the argument that
Tercon mandates a very different approach to exclusion clauses and that
pre-Tercon case law cannot be relied upon. In response, he stated:
I do not agree that Tercon has created a fundamentally different approach
to exclusion clauses. Rather, it has clarified the confusion and set out the
current state of the law. It is a logical, incremental progression from the
cases of the last two decades. It does not require discarding all of the
prior jurisprudence on exclusion clauses, only that which is inconsistent
with the current approach."'

135. Supra note 12. As David Percy observed in his comments on this comment, there are, at bottom,
only a few vantage points from which to assess an exclusion clause. Accordingly, adoption of both of
the approaches in Hunter, however stated or articulated, is somewhat inevitable.
136. Horizon Resource, supra note 105 at para 1011.
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Prior jurisprudence retains considerable precedential shine because, as this
conment has endeavoured to show, Tercon can very much be regarded as
Hunter Engineeringredux.

